CEO Turnover in Large Banks: Does Tail Risk Matter? by Srivastav, A et al.
This is a repository copy of CEO Turnover in Large Banks: Does Tail Risk Matter?.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/116747/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Srivastav, A orcid.org/0000-0003-4831-4458, Keasey, K orcid.org/0000-0001-7645-3274, 
Mollah, S et al. (1 more author) (2017) CEO Turnover in Large Banks: Does Tail Risk 
Matter? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 64 (1). pp. 37-55. ISSN 0165-4101 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.05.001
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 
4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
	

	

	 	 	 	 	 	 	 

 	 !"	 #	 #$"	 ! 	 "
%

	&

'(( !)*+,-.*)*/*012))2)-0
( 334553*)5*)*+3656


57)*05),5))*
8
 9**..
		 	


	 *7	9$	7)*,
	 *7	$	7)*0


	 *,	$	7)*0
	 	 
	 	  	 !"	 #	 #$"	 ! 	 	 
%

	&
"	 		 	 	 	 		 	 "
 	 
  
334553*)5*)*+3656


57)*05),5))*
	 	 	 '%	 8	 8	 	 	 :
	 	 	  	 

	 8
 
5			
			
:	;				$		8
	 :
5	 	 :
	 ;	 	 
$"	 $"	 
;	8			$	8	 8			 			8	
 	8:5
'		 		 	
	
	 	:$	 	
	;


	88
		
"				
:		$			6	5
;;;55
:3
36
  
1 
CEO Turnover in Large Banks: Does Tail Risk Matter? 
Abhishek Srivastava1, Kevin Keaseya2, Sabur Mollahb3, Francesco Vallascasc* 
aLeeds University Business School, UK 
bHull University Business School, University of Hull, Hull HU6 7RX, UK 
cLeeds University Business School, Maurice Keyworth Building, The University of Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK 
a.srivastav@leeds.ac.uk 
kk@lubs.leeds.ac.uk 
S.Mollah@hull.ac.uk 
fv@lubs.leeds.ac.uk 
*Corresponding author. Tel.: +44(0)1133434483; Fax: 44 (0)113 343 4459. 
Abstract 
Using a unique international dataset, we show that the CEOs of large banks exhibit an 
increased probability of forced turnover when their organizations are more exposed to 
idiosyncratic tail risks. The importance of idiosyncratic tail risk in CEO dismissals is 
strengthened when there is more competition in the banking industry and when stakeholders 
have more to lose in the case of distress. Overall, we document that the exposure to 
idiosyncratic tail risk offers valuable signals to bank boards on the quality of the choices 
made by CEOs and these signals are different from those provided by accounting and market 
measures of bank performance and by idiosyncratic volatility. In contrast, systematic tail risk 
is usually filtered out from the firing decision, only becoming important for forced CEO 
turnovers in the presence of a major variation in the costs that the exposure to this risk 
generates for shareholders and the organization. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted that the CEOs of large banks have incentives to implement business 
policies that increase their RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶ exposure to risks (Cohen et al., 2014; Ellul and 
Yerramilli, 2013; Gandhi and Lustig, 2015). These business policies are motivated by the 
highly levered nature of banks that provides CEOs with risk-taking incentives given the 
convexity of their stock and option holdings.  
While shareholders are not against executives taking risks, because equity is an out-of-the-
money call option whose value is increasing with risk (Acharya and Ryan, 2016; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), they do not have a preference for risks that can be detrimental to the 
survival of the bank (Stulz, 2015). A EDQN¶Vgrowing exposure to tail risks, measuring the 
possibility of suffering extremely large losses, could be dangerous for the organization 
(Cordella and Yeyati, 2003; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Hellmann et al., 2000; Keeley, 1990; 
Park and Peristiani, 2007). While an exposure to tail risks tends to reward shareholders with 
positive returns in many scenarios, it can also be associated with a small probability of 
extremely large losses that undermine DEDQN¶V longer-term survival (Cohen et al., 2014; Ellul 
and Yerramilli, 2013; Thanassoulis, 2013). 
The purpose of this paper is to understand whether increases in tail risk are associated with 
an increased likelihood of a forced CEO turnover in large banks. To this end, we present the 
first cross-country study of CEO turnovers in the banking industry based on a sample of 261 
large banks selected from 46 countries for the period 2004-2013.  
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Whether any link exists between tail risk and the likelihood of a CEO turnover in large 
banks lacks empirical evidence. This is particularly unfortunate given that dismissal is 
potentially an important mechanism to discipline CEOs by bank boards and reduce the 
chances that they overly expose their banks to extreme risks.  In fact, dismissal might lead 
not only to the loss of current employment but also the loss of unvested equity-based 
compensation (Dahiya and Yermack, 2008) and reduced future career opportunities (Brickley 
et al., 1999).  
Our analysis is guided by conventional theoretical models proposed for non-financial 
firms where boards employ performance, volatility and other signals to evaluate CEO choices 
(Bushman et al., 2010; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Holmstrom, 1982; Jenter and Kannan, 
2015). When these signals indicate bad outcomes for the corporation that are imputable to a 
lack of CEO ability or effort in the decision making, the dismissal of the CEO is a likely 
consequence. Along these lines, we argue that tail risk conveys different and additional 
signals, as compared to stock performance and volatility, of possible bad outcomes for the 
bank that can be related to CEO choices.  
An increasing exposure to tail risks, making a bank more vulnerable to events that can 
lead to extremely large losses and to a financial distress (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013), signals 
that the bank might find it more difficult and costly to conduct its business (Stulz, 2015). For 
instance, increases in tail risks lead to additional costs for shareholders related to the 
monitoring role of bank creditors and regulators. Both creditors and regulators do not benefit 
from the upside gains deriving from bank risk-taking while they bear the cost of the 
downside. It follows that especially in the presence of a growing tail risk exposure, creditors 
can significantly increase the risk-premium charged on bank debts and reduce the amount of 
available funds for the bank (Flannery, 2001; Schaeck et al., 2011; Stulz, 2015). At the same 
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time, regulators might more closely monitor banks and offer negative signals on their 
financial health with the consequence of reducing share prices and further increasing 
borrowing costs (Berger and Davies, 1998; DeYoung et al., 2001; Slovin et al., 1999). 
In our study we follow Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and Van Bekkum (2016) and use 
Expected Shortfall (ES) as our primary measure of bank tail risk. ES quantifies the downside 
of bank risk in the form of extremely large negative stock returns. ES is, therefore, a 
particularly appropriate signal that a bank is overly exposed to extreme risks that are 
detrimental to bank value. Furthermore, following studies that investigate the role of 
volatility in CEO dismissal in non-financial corporations (Bushman et al., 2010), we build 
our analysis on the distinction between idiosyncratic and systematic tail risk, with the former 
being seen as more directly linked to managerial choices.   
By focusing on tail risk, our work is related to the stream of research that emphasizes the 
importance of going beyond the investigations of (average) stock returns and profitability in 
order to explain forced CEO turnovers in corporations (see, for instance, Brickley, 2003). 
This type of investigation is the focus of earlier studies on CEO turnovers in the banking 
industry (see Hubbard and Palia, 1995). Furthermore, our paper extends and complements the 
analysis conducted on small US community banks by Schaeck et al. (2011) where the authors 
show that an increase in bank default risk (measured by the accounting Z-score) raises the 
likelihood of a forced CEO turnover due to the disciplinary role played by shareholders.  
Differently from the existing studies, we show the importance of accounting for tail risk in 
examining the decision to remove a CEO by the boards of large banks. We find a positive 
relationship between idiosyncratic tail risk and forced (but not voluntary) CEO turnover, and 
we document that the firing decision is not, in general, related to an exposure to systematic 
tail risk. Furthermore, we show that our result is not related to idiosyncratic tail risk capturing 
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a poor performance effect or simply an idiosyncratic volatility effect, as in the model 
proposed by Bushman et al. (2010), and holds under different empirical settings, including 
changes in the way we compute bank tail risk. 
A key consequence of the above results is that the importance of idiosyncratic tail risk for 
the firing decision should depend on the banking market structure as the evaluation of CEO 
choices is argued to be more difficult in more concentrated (less competitive) industries 
(DeFond and Park, 1999; Fee et al., 2013; Yonker 2017). This is because CEOs operating in 
more concentrated industries are less likely to be subject to similar uncertainties (DeFond and 
Park, 1999), have less peers (Brickley, 2003; Fee et al., 2013; Yonker, 2017), and their 
outputs are more likely to be influenced by the actions of other CEOs in the same industry 
(Holmstrom, 1982). Consistent with the view that the market structure influences the ability 
of the boards to identify unfit CEOs, we find that the sensitivity of forced CEO turnovers to 
idiosyncratic tail risk is lower in more concentrated banking markets. 
We next evaluate which stakeholders amplify the importance of tail risk for forced CEO 
turnovers. In doing so, we contribute to the literature on how different bank stakeholders 
react to downside risks in banks (Gandhi and Lustig, 2015). We show that the sensitivity of 
CEO dismissals to idiosyncratic tail risk increases with a larger presence of subordinated 
debtholders (namely debtholders that are liable to incur potentially larger losses in the case of 
a bank distress) or shareholders with lower diversification opportunities. In other words, there 
is a stronger relationship between idiosyncratic tail risk and CEO dismissal in the presence of 
stakeholders that have more to lose in the case of distress. 
The final part of our analysis looks more closely at DEDQN¶VH[SRVXUH WRV\VWHPDWLF tail 
risk.  In the case of large banks, there are specific factors that go against the argument that 
any exposure to systematic tail risk is completely unrelated to managerial choices. In 
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particular, recent banking studies suggest that bank CEOs have incentives to manufacture 
non-firm-specific tail risks and to engage in systematic risk-taking (modelled as an 
endogenous choice) to extract value from the financial safety net (Acharya et al., 2017; 
Acharya and Yorumazer, 2007; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016; Bushman and Williams, 
2015; Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Pennacchi, 2006).  
To understand how boards perceive systematic tail risk in large banks, we test for the 
presence of variation in the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to systematic tail risk when 
there are changes in the consequences a bank can suffer from being exposed to this risk. By 
using several alternative empirical settings, we consistently find that there is a stronger 
relationship between an exposure to systematic tail risk and CEO dismissal when such 
exposure is deemed to be more costly for a bank. For instance, we find that the sensitivity of 
CEO forced turnover to systematic tail risk is significantly larger after a bank is included in 
the list of global systemically important financial institutions by the Financial Stability 
Board. For these institutions, regulatory costs are linked to the systemic effects they produce 
(see Bongini et al., 2015) and the removal from the list only occurs when they no longer pose 
a global systemic threat. All in all, our tests indicate that the specificities of banks play a 
crucial role in the way bank boards see the exposure to systematic tail risk. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses why tail risks should 
matter for forced CEO turnovers in large banks. Section 3 describes the sample, econometric 
methods and variables. Section 4 examines the impact of D EDQN¶V idiosyncratic and 
systematic tail risk exposure on the likelihood of a CEO turnover, while Section 5 offers 
conclusions.   
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2. CEO Turnovers and the Tail Risk Exposure of Large Banks 
2.1 Tail Risk as a Signal of Bad Managerial Choice 
The existing literature offers little guidance on whether risk, and tail risk in particular, 
matters for the board decision of large banks to fire a CEO. Studies on non-financial 
corporations have mostly emphasized the importance of corporate performance for CEO 
turnover (Brickley, 2003; Chakraborty et al., 2007; Engel et al., 2003; Farell and Whidbee, 
2003; Fisman et al., 2014; Guo and Masulis, 2015; Hazarika et al., 2012; Jenter and Kannan, 
2015). An exception is Bushman et al. (2010) who argue that, for a given level of corporate 
performance, a higher level of idiosyncratic volatility is associated with an increase in the 
probability of a forced CEO turnover as it signals uncertainty about CEO talent.  
Similarly, with the exception of Schaeck et al. (2011), who focus on the importance of 
accounting default risk for forced CEO turnovers in US community banks, the limited 
number of studies on banks has only investigated the influence of performance (Hubbard and 
Palia, 1995) and the role of regulatory scrutiny on the turnover decision (Palvia, 2011; Webb, 
2008).  
In general, conventional theoretical models of CEO dismissal are built around the idea that 
boards assess the quality of CEO choices on the basis of performance, volatility and other 
signals (Bushman et al., 2010; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Holmstrom, 1982; Jenter and 
Kannan, 2015). These signals lead to the dismissal of the CEO when they indicate bad 
outcomes for the corporation and when these outcomes are due to a lack of CEO ability or 
effort in the decision making (bad choices). Using this setting as a starting point, we expect 
that increasing a bank¶V tail risk is associated with an increased likelihood of a forced CEO 
turnover. In other words, we postulate that tail risk offers signals of possible bad outcomes 
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for the corporation that are not contained in measures of performance and volatility and that 
are the result of CEO (bad) choices.  
In respect to the above, the extant literature shows WKDWDEDQN¶VH[posure to tail risks is 
conventionally seen as signalling a risk exposure that may be excessive (Cordella and Yeyati, 
2003; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Hellmann et al., 2000; Keeley, 1990; Park and Peristiani, 
2007). More precisely, shareholders want the CEO to take risks that are not detrimental to the 
corporation (Stulz, 2015), while an exposure to tail risks signals that a bank can be subject to 
extremely negative events that might threaten its survival. Furthermore, a growing exposure 
to tail risks can also affect the short-term value of the bank by leading to funding restrictions 
by creditors (especially if they are not protected by deposit insurance) and to increases in  
funding costs (Flannery, 2001; Schaeck et al., 2011; Stulz, 2015). 
 In addition, and differently from non-financial firms, banks are subject to monitoring by 
regulators who are concerned with the effects of bank tail risks on financial stability. An 
increased regulatory scrutiny due to tail risks has the potential to negatively influence 
shareholder wealth in several ways. Specifically, DeYoung et al. (2001) show that 
supervisory inspections that convey bad news lead to an increase in the borrowing costs of 
large commercial banks, while Berger and Davies (1998) and Slovin et al. (1999) find that 
negative regulatory assessments are associated with a decline in stock prices. Moreover, in 
the presence of an excessive risk exposure, regulators have the power to prohibit certain bank 
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activities, to dismiss bank managers and even to close down the bank (De Young et al., 2001; 
Schaeck et al., 2011).4  
In summary, an increasing exposure to tail risks amplifies bank distress costs and leads to 
the probability of losses in bank value caused by the monitoring role of bank creditors and 
regulators. It follows that a board should consider firing the CEO whenever a growing 
exposure to tail risks is associated with a lack of CEO ability or effort in terms of risk-
management. 
2.2 Sources of Tail Risks and Forced CEO Turnovers 
In understanding the drivers of the decision to fire a CEO, conventional theoretical models 
of non-financial firms highlight the importance of distinguishing WKHVRXUFHVRIDILUP¶VULVN
exposure. CEO choices are normally expected to influence the idiosyncratic component, but 
not the systematic component of risk. Accordingly, any type of systematic risk (including tail 
risk) should be seen as a manifestation of an exogenous event and as such not relevant to the 
firing decision. This is highlighted by models of CEO turnover based on the relative 
performance evaluation framework (Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 2013; Jenter and Kannan, 2015; 
Kaplan and Minton, 2012). Further, using a different theoretical setting, Bushman et al. 
(2010) argue that, differently from idiosyncratic volatility, an increase in systematic volatility 
                                                 
4 Regulatory influence is confirmed in a cross-country setting by a 2012 World Bank survey. The survey shows 
that in the presence of excessively risky policies, regulators might impose costly actions for shareholders such as a 
stop to dividend payments or the enforcement of a capital restoration plan. Furthermore, around 90% of the 
national supervisors have the powers to exercise enforcement actions that lead to the removal of bank managers and 
directors. 
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reduces the likelihood of a forced turnover as it makes it more problematic for boards to infer 
indications of CEO talent.  
There are, however, some specificities in the case of the tail risk of large banks that 
suggest some exposures to systematic sources of risk may be related to CEO choices.5 For 
instance, the presence of implicit and explicit government guarantees within the banking 
LQGXVWU\FDQLQGXFHEDQN&(2VWRIDYRUEXVLQHVVSROLFLHVWKDWLQFUHDVHDEDQN¶VHxposure to 
systematic tail risks or generate systematic tail risks (see Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Pennacchi, 
2006). Specifically, Pennacchi (2006) argues that banks are inclined to favor lending and off-
balance sheet activities with high exposure to systematic risks, as these business choices 
increase the value of their deposit insurance subsidy. In addition, Bushman and Williams 
(2015) demonstrate that, via their loan loss recognition policy, bank managers generate tail 
risks that have negative implications for the whole banking industry. Similarly, Acharya et al. 
(2010) argue that the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 is primarily the consequence of 
large and complex financial institutions manufacturing systematic tail risks.  
Nevertheless, the fact that exposure to systematic tail risk may be related to managerial 
choices does not necessarily imply that this exposure should matter for bank CEO dismissal.  
In fact, by increasing the exposure to systematic tail risks, a bank can increase the probability 
of receiving a governPHQW EDLORXW WKDW WUDQVIHUV WKH EDQN¶V ORVVHV WR WD[SD\HUV 7KLV LV
because these losses materialize in periods when other banks are also in trouble and 
                                                 
5 A possible endogeneity is, for instance, recognized within the macro-prudential view of banking regulation that 
has grown in importance post the global financial crisis (Beatty and Liao, 2014). Under this approach large banks are 
subject to additional rules and discipline motivated by the potential effects of their risk-taking on overall financial 
stability and not simply on the stability of individual banks.  
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regulators intend to preserve confidence in the banking industry by avoiding bank failures 
(Farhi and Tirole, 2012). Furthermore, an increasing exposure to systematic tail risks 
increases the probability of delaying the closure of a bank in distress, as the distress typically 
occurs in periods when regulators aim to avoid panic (see e.g. Acharya, 2009; Acharya and 
Yorulmazer, 2007; Bolton et al., 2015; Brown and Dinc, 2011). It follows that an exposure to 
systematic tail risks may be perceived by bank boards as being less damaging and dangerous 
than an exposure to idiosyncratic tail risks.  
 To summarize, the arguments indicating that bank boards should account for bank tail 
risk in the CEO firing decision should be primarily valid for the idiosyncratic component of 
this risk. Differently from systematic tail risk, idiosyncratic tail risk is not only more likely to 
be seen as a result of a lack of CEO ability or effort in managing risks but might also be seen 
as more likely to be detrimental for shareholders and the bank. 
3. Data, Econometric and Variables   
3.1 Data 
The analysis is based on a sample of listed, large commercial banks and bank holding 
companies with accounting data available from BankScope by Bureau van Dijk and market 
data available from Datastream International. We select the sampled banks from an initial list 
that included the top 500 listed large commercial banks and bank holding companies in terms 
of total assets at the end of 2004, as identified by BankScope. Our sample period is from 
2004 to 2013. From this initial list we retain only banks for which we are able to collect 
governance data (including data on CEOs) from annual and governance reports. We also 
search for governance information from various relevant databases, such as Bloomberg, 
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Business Week, Forbes and S&P Capital IQ. This reduces the sample size to approximately 
300 banks. 
As explained in the next section, our empirical model employs lagged explanatory 
variables to estimate the likelihood of a CEO turnover. Therefore, the first CEO turnover 
event we record occurs in January 2005 and the last turnover occurs in December 2013. This 
results in an initial sample of 342 turnover events. We then exclude turnovers where a 
temporary CEO was appointed during a time of transition or turnovers that were associated 
with mergers occurring over the same period.  
Next, we classify the remaining turnovers as forced or voluntary by conducting a manual 
search of news articles that explain the reason for each outgoing CEO. Our final classification 
follows Huson et al. (2001) and Parrino (1997).6 Furthermore, to minimize classification 
errors, we conduct additional investigations to validate whether the turnover was voluntary; 
namely, explaining if it was motivated by retirement, resignation for personal reasons or to 
pursue a new business, or by the outgoing CEO taking up another post in the same firm or a 
new job elsewhere. Finally, we remove turnovers where no reliable data could be found for 
WKHUHDVRQEHKLQGWKH&(2¶VGHSDUWXUH.  
                                                 
6 We classify a CEO turnover as forced if any of the following conditions are met: a) the announcement reports 
that the departing CEO was fired or dismissed; b) the outgoing CEO left because of poor performance, had a 
conflict of opinion with the board, or was under pressure from the board due to accounting scandals; c) the 
outgoing CEO is under the retirement age of 60 years but does not leave the firm for health reasons or to take up 
another job outside the firm; d) the turnover resulted from re-organization or re-structuring attempts initiated by the 
board or the government. 
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After imposing the described selection criteria, our final sample consists of accounting and 
market data for 1,994 observations (261 unique banks chartered in 46 countries) from 2004 to 
2012 and includes 74 forced turnovers and 198 voluntary turnovers for the period 2005-2013. 
Our sample size is similar to two recent cross-country studies that focus on the cross-
sectional relationship between bank governance and performance during the global financial 
crisis (see Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012). The proportion of forced turnovers 
is in line with the figures reported by studies on non-financial firms (Bushman et al., 2010; 
Jenter and Kannan, 2015). 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the sample distribution by country. As in previous cross-
country studies (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012), a large number of banks are 
concentrated in Japan and the US, representing 16.75% and 16.80% of the total number of 
observations, respectively. For the remaining countries, the share in terms of total 
observations does not exceed 5%. Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of turnovers by 
year and there is no obvious trend in CEO turnovers. 
3.2 Econometric Method 
In our sample of CEO turnovers, there are two key CEO exit mechanisms: 1) forced 2) 
voluntary. The two types of turnovers are mutually exclusive and compete with each other as 
potential exit mechanisms for managers in a given bank. Therefore, following Gregory-Smith 
et al. (2009) and Hazarika et al. (2012) and using the complete data about firms with no CEO 
turnover, forced turnovers and voluntary turnovers, we adopt a competing risks hazard model 
to account for the fact that forced turnovers are not the only exit mechanism for CEOs. 
The dependent variable of the model is CEO tenure (defined as the number of years a 
CEO held his/her chief executive position) and all independent variables are lagged by one 
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year to reduce simultaneity and endogeneity concerns. Under this empirical setting, the 
impact of each determinant varies for different types of CEO turnover. We describe the 
covariates used in our empirical analysis in the following sections.   
 
3.3 Measuring Bank Idiosyncratic and Systematic Tail Risk 
Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and Van Bekkum (2016) we use Expected Shortfall 
(ES) as our primary measure of a bank¶V tail risk exposure. ES quantifies the downside of 
bank risk in the form of extreme negative stock returns.   
We estimate idiosyncratic and systematic ES using the historical approach based on 
realized returns. The historical approach relies on the assumption that the realized exposure 
to extreme risks offers valuable indications on the expected exposure to these risks. In line 
with this view, Acharya et al. (2017) show that measures of extreme bank risk computed 
before the crisis predicted stock performance during the global crisis. ES is a common tool 
used in bank financial risk management (Acharya et al., 2017; Yamai and Yoshiba, 2005) 
where the historical approach is widely applied. For instance, Perignon and Smith (2010) 
show that historical simulation is by far the most popular estimation method employed by 
large banks over the period 1996-2005 to quantify their exposure to extreme market risks.  
More formally, for bank i, ES is (minus) the average daily return below the 5th percentile 
of the yearly distribution (see Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; Van Bekkum, 2016) and can be 
expressed as:7 
                                                 
7 For instance, with 200 daily stock returns and a 5th percentile equal to -2%, ES is the average daily return in the 
trading days where the daily stock returns are lower than -2%.  
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(6Lఈ -(ൣ5LWห5LW ൏ 5LWఈ ൧      (1) 
where 5LW is the daily stock return for bank i at day t and 5LWఈ  is DEDQN¶V daily stock return 
equal to the ߙ percentile (equal to the 5th percentile in our analysis) of the year t distribution. 
Conventionally, as shown in (1), to compute ES the average of the daily stock returns in the 
lower tail of the return distribution is multiplied by minus one such that higher values of ES 
indicate a higher bank exposure to extreme negative returns.  
However, as our predictions depend on the nature of a bank¶V tail risk exposure, we need 
to estimate the idiosyncratic and systematic components of ES. To this end, we start by 
extracting the idiosyncratic component of bank daily stock returns via the residuals of an 
augmented market model, where daily bank returns are regressed on market returns and 
industry returns (both based on domestic indexes provided by Datastream) as shown below:  
5LW ߚߚ5PWߚ5EWİMW       (2) 
where 5LW is the return for stock i at time t, 5PW is the daily return for the market index for 
each country, 5EW is the daily return for the banking industry index for each country. 
We then compute idiosyncratic (systematic) ES using the residuals (the predicted values) 
obtained from equation (2) that captures the time series of idiosyncratic (systematic) returns. 
As a result, following equation (1), Idiosyncratic ES is the average idiosyncratic return below 
the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution of the residuals ൫ߝƸMW൯ from the market model. 
Whereas Systematic ES is the average return below the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution 
of the predicted returns from the market model ቀ݅Ǥ ݁Ǥ ǡ ߚመߚመ5PWߚመ5EWቁ.    
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Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics of our tail risk measures for three different 
groups of banks: banks with no CEO turnovers, banks with at least one forced CEO turnover, 
and banks with at least one voluntary CEO turnover. The mean idiosyncratic (systematic) ES 
for banks that experienced forced turnovers is 2.25% (3.50%), as compared to 2.06% (2.94%) 
for banks with no turnovers and the difference is statistically significant. By contrast, the 
mean (median) idiosyncratic ES and systematic ES for banks with voluntary CEO turnovers 
are not statistically different from those of banks with no CEO turnovers.  
3.4 Bank Stock Performance and Volatility 
Previous studies show that CEO dismissals are extreme forms of pay-performance 
sensitivity, where poor performance leads to a greater likelihood of turnover (Huson et al., 
2001; Parrino, 1997). As our tail risk measures are based on the yearly stock return 
distribution, their impact on dismissal might then simply be the result of a poor performance 
effect. 
In our empirical setting we, therefore, account for stock performance. We construct 
measures of idiosyncratic and systematic stock returns based on the approach followed by 
Jenter and Kannan (2015). Specifically, we compute idiosyncratic and systematic stock 
returns by annualizing daily values of predicted and residual stock returns using equation (2).  
Despite tail risk and volatility being closely related, Rosenberg and Schuermann (2006) 
demonstrate that they can be affected differently by bank decisions in terms of business mix 
and by the degree of correlation among different forms of risk exposure. 8  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
8 Specifically, for a typical large internationally active bank, Rosenberg and Schuermann (2006) demonstrate that 
different combinations of market, credit and operational risk exposures lead to a similar degree of bank volatility but 
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previous studies show that stock volatility matters for the firing decision in non-financial 
firms (see, for instance, Bushman et al., 2010). Accordingly, we also control for a volatility 
effect by including in the model idiosyncratic and systematic volatility components that we 
compute at a yearly frequency for the residual and predicted returns from equation (2). 
While Panel B of Table 2 reports summary statistics for our measures of stock 
performance and volatility, Panel C shows their (Pearson and Spearman) correlation 
coefficients with tail risk measures. All tail risk measures show a relatively low degree of 
correlation with measures of idiosyncratic and systematic performance, whereas they are 
clearly more correlated with volatility components. 9  In general, the correlation analysis 
confirms that tail risk and volatility, though correlated, capture different features oIDEDQN¶V
risk exposure. 
3.5 Other Controls 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the other bank fundamentals that are potential determinants of 
CEO turnover (see Jenter and Kannan, 2015; Parrino, 1997; Schaeck et al., 2011). We control 
for accounting performance, based on a bank¶V ROA, since a short-term profit measure is 
usually a key predictor of CEO dismissal (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Parrino, 1997). We also 
include industry ROA since poor industry performance also results in an increasing CEO 
dismissal risk (Jenter and Kannan, 2015; Schaeck et al., 2011). We measure bank-specific 
                                                                                                                                                       
different exposures to tail risk. This is because, typically, market risk exposures are characterized by higher volatility 
but shorter fat-tails in their distribution, while credit risk and operational risk exposures show an opposite pattern.  
9 More precisely the Pearson correlation coefficient between idiosyncratic (systematic) ES and idiosyncratic 
(systematic) returns is -0.34 (-0.37). The Pearson correlation between idiosyncratic (systematic) ES and idiosyncratic 
(systematic) volatility is approximately 0.81 (0.82).  
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DFFRXQWLQJ SHUIRUPDQFH DV D EDQN¶V52$PLQXV WKHmean ROA of the domestic banking 
sector (Profitability) and include the mean ROA (Industry Profitability) at the country level 
to account for general (systematic) industry performance. 
 
 We control for the size of a bank (Bank Size) by the log of total assets (in thousands of US 
dollars). Larger banks have a bigger pool of talented executives to replace the existing CEO 
and this should lead to a larger probability of CEO turnover (Chakraborty et al., 2007). We 
also include bank size squared, as we find evidence of a non-linearity in the relationship 
between CEO turnovers and size. Next, we control for the capital strength of a bank (Bank 
Capital), measured by the ratio between the book value of equity and the book value of bank 
assets, and a bank¶V charter value (Charter Value), measured as the sum of the market value 
of DEDQN¶Vequity and the total book value of a bank¶V liabilities all scaled by the book value 
of a bank¶V assets. Lower equity capital and charter values (signaling lower growth 
opportunities) may trigger an increased risk-taking and greater levels of regulatory pressure 
to replace poorly performing CEOs (Schaeck et al., 2011).  
Panel B shows measures of bank internal governance and of external monitoring that can 
also impact the dismissal risk of CEOs (Laux, 2008; Yermack, 1996). For instance, smaller 
boards are associated with better performance and a greater threat of CEO dismissal (see, for 
instance, Yermack, 1996). More independent boards are expected to be more likely to 
challenge and replace an underperforming CEO (Laux, 2008; Weisbach, 1988), although 
entrenched CEOs may exert power over the board and reduce the likelihood of termination 
(Berger et al., 1997; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Accordingly, we control for the log of 
the number of board members (Board Size) and for the degree of board independence 
(Independent Directors) measured by the ratio between independent directors and total board 
  
19 
members. We include an index of CEO power (CEO Power) based on the sum of two binary 
variables: a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO was internally promoted and a dummy 
variable equal to one if the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board. We expect that 
more powerful CEOs are less likely to be dismissed.  
Next, we control for the percentage of shares held by insiders excluding the CEO (Insider 
Ownership). Higher levels of insider ownership result in internalizing the costs of bank 
default (Booth et al., 2002) and are likely to lead to a greater likelihood of CEO dismissal 
(Huson et al., 2001). However, higher levels of insider ownership could also lead to 
entrenchment and reduce the level of monitoring and discipline of CEOs (Denis et al., 1997; 
Goyal and Park, 2002).  
CEO turnovers might also depend on the strength of the risk governance within a bank. 
Risk committees (and the Chief Risk Officer) evaluate and communicate to the board the 
impact of managerial policies on the risk-profile of the bank (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013; 
Keys et al., 2009). We measure the strength of the risk-management function (Risk 
Governance) as the sum of two binary variables that take a value of one if there is a risk 
committee and if there is a Chief Risk Officer. 
We finally control for two sources of the external monitoring of bank managers. First, we 
control for the influence of bank regulation (Booth et al., 2002; Schaeck et al., 2011) by 
including the general strength of the supervisory agency (Supervisory Power) from Barth et 
al. (2004) and the subsequent surveys conducted by the World Bank.10 Second, we control for 
                                                 
10 In the case of banks, another source of monitoring is the presence of subordinated debt-holders. While we do 
not control for this in our preferred specification, due to the large number of missing values in our dataset, we 
conduct additional tests in section 4.5 where this disciplinary channel is explicitly taken into account. 
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the percentage of bank stock owned by institutional investors (Institutional Ownership). 
Institutional shareholders can discipline firm management by the threat of exit (Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011) and are likely to show better skills in assessing 
CEOs relative to their peers. 
Finally, Panel C reports additional country controls. The first is the concentration of the 
banking market (Bank Concentration) measured as the log transformation of the Herfindahl 
index of bank deposits in each country. In less concentrated markets there could be a higher 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover, as board members can accurately benchmark CEO 
performance to peers and identify poorly performing executives (DeFond and Park, 1999; 
Goyal and Park, 2002; Holmstrom, 1982). Further, a more concentrated market might 
indicate a lower number of peers in the external market for executives, with a consequent 
increase in the difficulty of replacing an incumbent CEO (Fee et al., 2013; Yonker, 2017). 
We then include a country-level index from the World Bank database on Doing Business 
(Director Liability Index) that measures the power of shareholders to implicate directors for 
self-interested behavior. We expect a greater likelihood of CEO turnover in countries where 
shareholder power is higher. We also control for the degree of regulatory restrictions placed 
on bank activities (Activity Restrictions) from the World Bank regulatory dataset. In countries 
with a more complex banking business, bank boards could find it more difficult to understand 
a bank¶V business model and the related signals for the firing decision.   
Next, the GDP per capita (Development) accounts for the degree of economic 
development of a country that might affect the monitoring ability of stakeholders and 
consequently the probability of forced turnovers. We use the ratio between the fiscal balance 
and country GDP (Fiscal Capacity) to capture the possibility that countries with a larger 
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budget balance are more likely to extend government guarantees to weak banks (Brown and 
Dinc, 2011). As in Houston et al. (2010), we also control for country size (Size of Economy) 
through the log of domestic GDP in millions of US dollars to account for the fact that a few 
large economies may be driving our results and for the inflation rate (Inflation).   
4.  Tail Risk and CEO Turnover 
4.1 Does D%DQN¶VTail Risk Exposure Matter? 
We begin our empirical analysis by first estimating a baseline specification for the full 
sample of CEO turnovers with idiosyncratic and systematic ES as the key explanatory 
variables and controlling for bank fundamentals (including stock return and volatility 
components) and country characteristics. We then extend the baseline specification with the 
addition of measures of internal and external monitoring mechanisms that might affect the 
firing decision (column (2)).  
 
The results, reported in Table 4, provide consistent evidence that the hazard rate of a 
forced CEO turnover is positively associated with idiosyncratic bank tail risk: idiosyncratic 
ES enters all models with a positive coefficient that is significant at customary levels.11 In 
contrast, idiosyncratic and systematic ES are not significantly associated with the hazard of a 
                                                 
11 Our results are not affected by the correlation between the tail risk and volatility components. We achieve 
similar conclusions when we re-estimate the models without idiosyncratic and systematic volatility as control 
variables. 
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voluntary turnover.12 +HQFHD&(2¶VGHFLVLRQ WRYROXQWDULO\ OHDYHDEDQN is not associated 
with the EDQN¶VH[SRVXUHWRWDLOULVN 
Our results for forced turnovers are also economically significant: a one standard deviation 
increase in idiosyncratic ES leads to an increase in CEO dismissal risk by approximately 61% 
using the coefficients obtained from model (2). 13  Moreover, all these tests show that 
systematic tail risk does not influence CEO forced turnover.   
A possible interpretation of our findings is that an increase in the probability of a forced 
turnover might induce managers to increase idiosyncratic tail risk as an extreme attempt to 
boost value. However, the existing literature does not generally show that an increasing risk 
of dismissal increases the risk appetite of CEOs. In fact, Chakraborty (2007) shows the 
contrasting result that corporate risk-taking increases when CEOs have a higher job security. 
Furthermore, in the Online Appendix, similarly to Chakraborty (2007), we document that an 
increase in CEO dismissal risk is not associated with increases in bank tail risk, including 
idiosyncratic tail risk.  
The above test, however, does not rule out another possible interpretation based on 
Weisbach (1988). He observes that stock returns incorporate the expectations that a CEO will 
be fired. Accordingly, the returns of a bank managed by a CEO that will be fired are higher 
                                                 
12 In untabulated tests we find this conclusion also holds when we follow Acharya et al. (2017) and replace our 
measure of systematic tail risk with the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES); namely, the expected bank return when 
the market is under distress conditions. We compute MES as the average bank return in trading days when the 
market daily return is below the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution. 
13 The coefficients reported in Table 4 reflect the increase/decrease in the log cause-specific hazards ratio. 
Therefore, we exponentiate the coefficients and then calculate the economic significance.  
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than they would be otherwise. The anticipation effect embedded in stock returns also 
influences tail risk and volatility. In essence, when the market anticipates a forced turnover, a 
EDQN¶VUHWXUQGLVWULEXWLRQFKDQJHV leading to tail risk and volatility being informative on CEO 
dismissal while stock returns are not (as in our analysis).  While in section 4.2, we show that 
our results remain valid when we employ an accounting based measure of tail risk that, as 
argued by Weisbach (1988), should be less affected by any anticipation effect, we 
acknowledge the difficulties in fully ruling out an interpretation based on this effect.  
Moving onto the analysis of the control variables, we find that numerous variables are 
significantly related to the likelihood of a CEO turnover in large banks. Consistent with 
Bushman et al. (2010), we find that idiosyncratic volatility is positively associated with the 
likelihood of a forced turnover while it is not significantly related to voluntary turnovers. 
Furthermore, CEOs at large banks are more likely to experience forced turnovers. Moreover, 
in most of the specifications, CEOs at banks with higher capital ratios are less likely to be 
fired or to voluntarily leave a bank, while higher charter values (signaling more growth 
opportunities) are associated with a reduced probability of CEO dismissal. The likelihood of 
a forced turnover, but not of a voluntary turnover, is also lower in banks with a higher 
profitability.  
In terms of bank governance, as in the literature on non-financial firms (Del Guercio et al., 
2008; Guo and Masulis, 2015; Helwege et al., 2012; Parrino et al., 2003), we find that an 
increase in CEO power is associated with a reduced likelihood of both forced and voluntary 
turnovers, while higher levels of institutional ownership are more (less) likely to be 
associated with a CEO being fired (leaving voluntarily). As far as country controls are 
concerned, similarly to DeFond and Park (1999) and Goyal and Park (2002) for non-financial 
firms, in most of the specifications we find that the likelihood of a forced turnover is 
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negatively associated with the degree of banking market concentration. Finally, forced 
turnovers occur more frequently in more shareholder-oriented countries as indicated by 
higher values of the director liability index.  
In general, the results of this section suggest that idiosyncratic tail risk is significantly 
associated with the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover and offers incremental information 
as compared to accounting and market measures of performance and, more importantly,  
idiosyncratic volatility. 
4.2 Is the Idiosyncratic Tail Risk Effect Different from a Poor Idiosyncratic 
Performance Effect? 
A possible explanation for our finding still remains that our measures of idiosyncratic ES 
(based on extreme negative returns) are to some extent capturing an effect due to low 
idiosyncratic stock returns. We conduct a series of tests to further demonstrate that 
idiosyncratic tail risk has an effect on forced CEO turnover independently from realized 
idiosyncratic stock performance. 
Specifically, we start by focusing on a sub-sample of banks that excludes low 
idiosyncratic returns (based on the sample median) and re-estimate the competing risks 
hazard model for this sub-sample. As shown in column (1) of Table 5, we still find that 
idiosyncratic tail risk is associated (at the 10% level) with a greater hazard of CEO dismissal, 
while systematic tail risk does not matter for CEO dismissals. Therefore, the impact of 
idiosyncratic tail risk on forced turnover is also observable when we exclude poorly 
performing banks.  
We next construct a sub-sample of banks that exclude those institutions with 
(simultaneously) low idiosyncratic performance (below the sample median) and high 
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idiosyncratic volatility (above the sample median) to control for the possibility that our above 
finding is motivated by a high volatility effect. Again, we still find that idiosyncratic tail risk 
is significant (at the 10% level) in our model. 
 
As a further robustness check, we repeat our analysis by using alternative extreme risk 
measures that, as shown in the Online Appendix, have a much lower correlation with 
measures of realized idiosyncratic stock performance (and volatility). We start by following 
Bushman and Williams (2015) that employ Skewness as an alternative market-based measure 
of extreme risk. Next, we employ a risk measure focusing on extreme accounting returns 
(Accounting Downside Risk). This measure is computed as a dummy variable that takes a 
YDOXHRIRQHLIDEDQN¶V52$LVEHORZWKHth percentile of the estimated earnings distribution 
that we assume follows a normal distribution and we build on the basis of a seven year rolling 
window of accounting returns starting from 2000. Consistent with our main analysis, we then 
compute the firm-specific (idiosyncratic) and non-firm-specific (systematic) risk measures. 
We still find that forced CEO turnover is limited to the firm-specific component of tail risk.14 
4.3 Alternative Model Specifications 
We conduct various additional tests to check the robustness of our key findings. We report 
the results of these additional tests in the Online Appendix. We first address the concern that 
our results may be sensitive to using a competing risks hazard model. We, therefore, estimate 
                                                 
14 The literature (see, for instance, Van Bekkum (2016)) often employs directly the negative value of the stock 
return corresponding to the 5th SHUFHQWLOHRIWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIGDLO\VWRFNUHWXUQVGHILQHGDVDEDQN·VVaR ) as a 
measure of tail risk. In the Online Appendix, we show that our key results remain unchanged also when VaR is used 
as a tail risk measure. 
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a multinomial logit model that is commonly employed by the prior literature on the 
determinants of executive turnovers (Huson et al., 2001). Second, we use a simple Cox 
hazard model whereby we focus only on forced CEO turnovers and treat all voluntary 
turnovers as censored observations, as in Brookman and Thistle (2009) and Jenter and 
Kannan (2015). The results of these tests confirm that our primary findings still hold.  
Next, we stipulate that a CEO should be in charge for at least two consecutive years before 
experiencing a turnover event. Hence, we exclude all observations where CEO turnovers took 
place less than two years after a new CEO was appointed. Again, we do not find any change 
in our findings.  
In our sample period numerous countries experienced a systemic crisis as identified by 
Laeven and Valencia (2013). It is often argued that CEO dismissals during crises may be a 
response by boards to increasing public vitriol and regulatory scrutiny into holding 
executives responsible for mismanagement. 15  To control for the influence of systemic 
banking crises on our results, we include a dummy (Crisis) variable that takes the value of 
one for every year-country combination identifying a systemic banking crisis. Our primary 
findings remain similar as regards the positive relationship between idiosyncratic tail risk and 
the likelihood of CEO dismissals.  
 
                                                 
15 6HH IRU H[DPSOH ¶%DQN FKLHIV LQ WKH ILULQJ OLQH· 7KH ,QGHSHQGHQW  2FW  ¶5R\DO %DQN RI 6FRWODQG
chiefs tREHIRUFHGRXWXQGHUEDLORXWGHDO·7KH7HOHJUDSK2FW ¶2I/DWHVW%DQN2I$PHULFD%DLORXW
8VHG7R3D\0HUULOO/\QFK%RQXVHV%$&·%XVLQHVV,QVLGHU-DQ¶86ZDWFKGRJFDOOVIRUEDQNH[HFXWLYHV
WREHVDFNHG·7KH*XDUGLDQ$SULO  
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4.4 Does the Importance of Idiosyncratic Tail Risk on Forced Turnovers depend on the 
Banking Market Structure? 
Our results are consistent with the view that a bank board learns about the CEO¶s decision 
making via the exposure to idiosyncratic tail risk. A key implication deriving from such a 
result is that the importance assigned to idiosyncratic tail risk should depend on the market 
structure within which the bank operates. 
Specifically, previous studies on non-financial firms argue that the importance assigned to 
signals related to CEO choices becomes lower when the industry concentration is higher 
(Brickley, 2003; DeFond and Park, 1999; Goyal and Park, 2002) as the assessment of CEO 
decision making is better facilitated in competitive environments. Furthermore, more 
concentrated markets tend to be characterized by greater difficulties in replacing an 
incumbent CEO because of the lower number of peers in the external market for executives 
(Brickley, 2003; Fee et al., 2013; Yonker, 2017). 
While the existing empirical evidence focuses on the interplay between performance and 
market structure, a similar argument should hold for idiosyncratic tail risk. In this section, we 
test this conjecture by extending our baseline specification with interaction terms between 
idiosyncratic and systematic ES and our measure of banking market concentration.  
 
The results reported in column (1) of Table 6 show that the coefficient of Idiosyncratic ES 
* Bank Concentration is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that in more 
concentrated banking markets, large banks are less likely to dismiss CEOs when idiosyncratic 
tail risk increases. The results also appear economically relevant: an increase in the degree of 
bank concentration from the lowest quartile (i.e. countries with low concentration) to the 
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highest quartile (i.e. countries with high concentration) is associated with a reduction in the 
sensitivity of forced turnovers to idiosyncratic tail risk by 54% for a one standard deviation 
increase in idiosyncratic tail risk for model (1). Furthermore, as shown in column (2), we 
achieve a similar result when we employ the (log of) market share in the deposit market of 
the four largest banks in a given country as an alternative measure of banking market 
concentration. 
Overall, in line with the prior evidence that indicates concentration reduces the sensitivity 
of forced CEO turnovers to relative performance in non-financial firms (DeFond and Park, 
1999; Goyal and Park, 2002), we show that in the case of the banking industry, market 
concentration is also associated with a reduced sensitivity of CEO dismissals to idiosyncratic 
tail risk. 
4.5 Which Bank Stakeholders Care More about Idiosyncratic Tail Risk? 
In this section we evaluate which bank stakeholders are associated with an increased 
sensitivity of CEO turnovers to idiosyncratic tail risk. We look at the role played by bank 
uninsured creditors, inside shareholders, regulators and institutional investors. To capture the 
influence of uninsured creditors, we focus on subordinated debtholders since they are subject 
to a larger risk of suffering losses than other bank creditors and are a key source of discipline 
for bank executives (Ashcraft, 2008; Goyal, 2005; Nier and Baumann, 2006). 
Insiders might have a lower tolerance for idiosyncratic tail risk since they have limited 
diversification opportunities (Gao, 2010). Consequently, a higher level of insider ownership 
might result in internalizing the costs of a bank default (Booth et al., 2002) and lead to a 
decline in the expected utility of pursuing risky policies (Faccio et al., 2011). In short, bank 
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insiders might fear the costs associated with idiosyncratic tail risk more than other types of 
bank shareholders. 
Under the micro-prudential view of banking regulation, increased supervisory power 
should be associated with a larger sensitivity of CEO turnover to idiosyncratic tail risk. More 
controversial is the possible role of institutional investors. While they might have better skills 
in monitoring bank management than other shareholders, the fact that institutional investors 
usually hold diversified portfolios might reduce the importance assigned to idiosyncratic tail 
risk when assessing CEO performance.  
 
To conduct the empirical tests, we estimate models with interaction terms between the 
selected variables and tail risk measures. The results, reported in Table 7, suggest that some 
types of bank stakeholders might be more important than others in exercising discipline in 
terms of idiosyncratic tail risk. Specifically, an increase in the share of subordinated debt in a 
EDQN¶VFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUHor in inside ownership is associated with an increased sensitivity of 
CEO turnover to idiosyncratic tail risk but this sensitivity does not vary with the strength of 
supervisory power or the importance of institutional shareholders.  
Overall, the results discussed in this section are not surprising when compared to US-
based studies on non-financial firms (Del Guercio et al., 2008; Guo and Masulis, 2015; 
Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Parrino et al., 2003). Nevertheless, we caution drawing 
conclusions from the reported findings given the cross-country heterogeneity in bank 
governance structures in our sample.   
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4.6 Do Bank Boards See Systematic Tail Risk as Fully Unrelated to CEO Choices? 
We next evaluate when systematic tail risk is important for the firing decision. This 
additional analysis is motivated by a growing body of banking research showing that 
systematic tail risks are not necessarily exogenous to bank behavior (see, for instance, 
Acharya et al., 2010; Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Pennacchi, 2006). 
Our approach is to test for the presence of variation in the sensitivity of forced CEO 
turnover to systematic tail risk when there are changes in the consequences a bank can suffer 
from being exposed to such risks. A variation in the sensitivity of forced turnover to 
systematic tail risks in the presence of these changes would suggest that an exposure to 
systematic tail risk is related, at least in part, to CEO choices.  
To conduct this additional analysis, we consider three different settings. The first two 
settings identify contexts where shareholders might see being exposed to systematic tail risk 
as more costly. We start by focusing on the period post 2010 when there was greater 
regulatory and policy attention to systemic matters related to large financial institutions 
However, it can be argued that the post 2010 environment also witnessed other broader 
economic changes that may result in a weaker identification. In an attempt to provide a more 
refined test, we next focus on the institutions in our sample included in the list of global 
systemically important financial institutions by the Financial Stability Board since 2010. For 
these institutions regulatory costs are closely related to systemic effects. The inclusion in this 
list is seen negatively by shareholders (see Bongini et al., 2015) and banks can be removed 
only when they do not pose a global systemic threat. 
Accordingly, our expectation is that if CEO choices are seen as influencing D EDQN¶V
exposure to systematic tail risk, we should observe an increase in the sensitivity of CEO 
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turnover to systematic tail risk post-2010 and, more importantly, for banks that are identified 
as globally systemically important. To conduct our analysis, we first interact our measures of 
tail risk with a dummy equal to one for the years after 2010. Next, we repeat a similar test 
using a dummy (SIFI) equal to one for global systemically important financial institutions.  
In a third test, we use the cross-country variation in the adoption of blanket guarantees by 
governments on banks debts. Under a blanket guarantee, a government offers protection 
against a bank default to creditors that are not conventionally protected by deposit insurance. 
The purpose is to prevent negative externalities arising from correlated bank defaults (Laeven 
and Valencia, 2012). Under a blanket guarantee, the mispricing of government guarantees is 
more pronounced and banks have more possibilities to extract value from the financial safety 
net via their risk-taking. To extract value, however, banks have to avoid closure by regulators 
and, thereby, benefit from forbearance (Allen and Saunders, 1993; Ronn and Verma, 1986). 
This is more likely when banks increase their exposure to non-firm-specific risks (Acharya 
and Yorulmazer, 2007; Brown and Dinç, 2011). In the presence of a blanket guarantee, we 
should, therefore, observe a decrease in the sensitivity of a forced CEO turnover to 
systematic tail risk if CEO choices can influence the exposure to this risk. To conduct this 
third test, we employ a dummy (Blanket Guarantee) that equals one for the time period over 
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which bank liabilities in each country were insured.16 We then include this dummy and its 
interaction with the tail risk measures as additional explanatory variables in our models.  
 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 show the key findings of the first and the second tests, 
while column (3) reports the results of the third test. In general, the results suggest that an 
exposure to systematic tail risk is, at least, partially related to CEO choices.17 The interaction 
terms between our measures of systematic tail risk and the post 2010 or the SIFI dummy (the 
blanket guarantee dummy) are positive (negative) and statistically significant at customary 
levels.18  
                                                 
16  In our sample 15 countries used blanket guarantees. Data on blanket guarantees are from Laeven and 
Valencia (2012) and IADI (2005, 2008). We complement these data sources with data from national deposit 
insurance funds. There is considerable heterogeneity in terms of the time-period over which such guarantees were 
extended. For instance, various countries (e.g. Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey) extended blanket guarantees 
during 2004-05. Similarly, some countries (e.g. Australia, Hungary, and Portugal) extended the support beyond the 
2007-2009 crisis to cover 2010 and 2011.  
17 The post-2010 coefficient is subsumed in year dummies and hence is not reported in the table. 
18 An alternative explanation of our finding on blanket guarantees could be panic. Blanket guarantees are often 
associated with systemic crises where regulators might provide incentives to banks to retain CEOs to avoid 
exacerbating panic conditions in the system.  In the Online Appendix, we employ an alternative blanket guarantee 
dummy that takes a value equal to one only when the guarantee covers bank debt in non-systemic crisis periods. The 
test shows a decline in the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to systematic tail risk in non-crisis periods covered by 
blanket guarantees.  
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In summary, the findings discussed in this section suggest that bank boards assign 
importance to systematic tail risk for forced CEO turnovers when there is a major variation in 
the costs that the exposure to this risk generates for shareholders and the bank.  
5. Conclusions  
Our analysis shows that the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover (but not of a voluntary 
turnover) is positively associated with idiosyncratic tail risk. Thus, large bank CEOs do seem 
to bear some costs of increasing the idiosyncratic tail risk of their banks. Furthermore, the 
relation with idiosyncratic tail risk is stronger in less concentrated banking industries and in 
the presence of stakeholders that have more to lose from an increase in this risk. In general, 
we document that idiosyncratic tail risk offers information to assess CEOs¶GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ 
that is different from what can be inferred from accounting and market measures of 
performance and idiosyncratic volatility.  
Finally, we show that the lack of importance of systematic tail risk that we observe over 
the full sample period for CEO dismissal does not imply this risk is fully independent from 
CEO choices.  Our analysis documents that how bank boards see the exposure to systematic 
tail risk, and the role of this risk in the firing decision, depends on the benefits and costs that 
such exposure might generate for the bank. 
APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1 Variable Definitions. 
This Table shows variable definitions. Risk measures and country characteristics are measured at the calendar year-end and bank 
financials and governance characteristics are measured at the fiscal year-end.  
 
Variable Definition 
Idiosyncratic ES Average residual returns below the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution (%) using the specified market 
model in equation (2), multiplied by -1. 
Systematic ES Average predicted returns below the 5th percentile of the yearly distribution (%) using the specified market 
model in equation (2), multiplied by -1. 
Idiosyncratic Returns % Annualized daily values of residual stock returns using the specified market model in equation (2) 
computed at yearly intervals. 
Systematic Returns % Annualized daily values of predicted stock returns using the specified market model in equation (2) 
computed at yearly intervals. 
Idiosyncratic Volatility Standard deviation of residual stock returns using the specified market model in equation (2) computed at 
yearly intervals. 
Systematic Volatility Standard deviation of predicted stock returns using the specified market model in equation (2) computed at 
yearly intervals. 
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Profitability ROA ± mean ROA of the banking industry, expressed in percentages. 
Industry Profitability Mean ROA of the banking industry, expressed in percentages. 
Bank Size Natural log of total assets. 
Bank Capital Book value of Equity/Book value of Assets, expressed in percentages.  
Charter Value Market value of Assets/Book value of Assets, where market value is the sum of market value of equity and 
book value of liabilities 
Board Size Natural log of the number of board members. 
Independent Directors % of independent directors on the board. 
CEO Power Yearly index computed as the sum of two indicator variables: CEO also serves as the Chairman and presence 
of an internal CEO. Yes = 1 and No = 0. 
Insider Ownership % of shares owned by insiders, excluding the CEO, in the bank, as defined by S&P Capital IQ. 
Risk Governance Yearly index computed as the sum of two indicator variables: presence of a Chief Risk Officer and presence 
of Risk Committee. Yes = 1 and No = 0. 
Bank Concentration Log of Herfindahl Index for bank deposits in each country. 
Supervisory Power Extent of supervisory power to correct problems. As used in Barth et al. (2004) and constructed from the 
World Bank Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision. 
Institutional Ownership % of shares owned by institutional investors, as defined by S&P Capital IQ. 
Crisis Indicator variable that equals one for each country-year combination that had a systemic banking crisis. 
Post-2010 Indicator variable that equals one for the post-2010 period, and zero otherwise. 
SIFI  Indicator variable that equals one for banks present in the list of global systemically important financial 
institutions by the Financial Stability Board post 2010 
Blanket Guarantee Indicator variable that equals one for the time period over which bank liabilities in each country were 
insured. 
Activity Restrictions Extent of regulatory restrictions placed on bank activities. As used in Barth et al. (2004) and constructed from 
the World Bank Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision. 
Development GDP per capita (million US$). 
Fiscal Capacity  Government revenues minus expenditures scaled by GDP.  
Size of Economy Natural log of GDP (million US$). 
Inflation % inflation rate. 
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Table 1 Sample Distribution. 
This Table presents the distribution of our sample of 261 banks across 46 countries from 2005-2013. Panel A presents the sample by 
country and Panel B by year.  
 Observations Banks 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Country 
Australia 40 2.01 5 1.92 
Austria 31 1.55 4 1.53 
Bahrain 9 0.45 1 0.38 
Belgium 22 1.10 3 1.15 
Brazil 17 0.85 2 0.77 
Canada 57 2.86 7 2.68 
Chile 14 0.70 2 0.77 
China 73 3.66 11 4.21 
Cyprus 7 0.35 1 0.38 
Czech Republic 9 0.45 1 0.38 
Denmark 25 1.25 3 1.15 
Finland 9 0.45 1 0.38 
France 34 1.71 4 1.53 
Germany 56 2.81 7 2.68 
Greece 49 2.46 6 2.30 
Hong Kong 27 1.35 3 1.15 
Hungary 9 0.45 1 0.38 
Iceland 2 0.10 1 0.38 
India 56 2.81 8 3.07 
Indonesia 27 1.35 3 1.15 
Ireland 23 1.15 3 1.15 
Israel 31 1.55 4 1.53 
Italy 53 2.66 6 2.30 
Japan 334 16.75 47 18.01 
Jordan 7 0.35 1 0.38 
Korea 39 1.96 6 2.30 
Luxembourg 9 0.45 1 0.38 
Malaysia 53 2.66 6 2.30 
Mexico 18 0.90 2 0.77 
Netherlands 18 1.00 3 1.15 
Norway 20 0.45 1 0.38 
Poland 17 0.85 2 0.77 
  
39 
Portugal 27 1.35 3 1.15 
Russia 6 0.30 1 0.38 
Saudi Arabia 26 1.30 5 1.92 
Singapore 27 1.35 3 1.15 
South Africa 44 2.21 5 1.92 
Spain 48 2.41 6 2.30 
Sweden 27 1.35 3 1.15 
Switzerland 30 1.50 4 1.53 
Taiwan 85 4.26 12 4.60 
Thailand 51 2.56 6 2.30 
Turkey 34 1.71 5 1.92 
UAE 9 0.45 1 0.38 
United Kingdom 59 2.96 8 3.07 
United States 335 16.80 43 16.48 
Total  1994 100% 261 100% 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Year 
 
Year Observations Turnovers Forced Turnovers 
  Number Percentage Number Percentage 
2005 186 24 8.82 7 9.46 
2006 207 22 8.09 4 5.40 
2007 220 27 9.93 6 8.11 
2008 236 28 10.29 13 17.57 
2009 239 44 16.18 11 14.86 
2010 241 35 12.87 7 9.46 
2011 228 25 9.19 4 5.41 
2012 216 29 10.66 10 13.51 
2013 221 38 13.97 12 16.22 
Total 1994 272 100% 74 100% 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix: Tail Risk, Return and Volatility Measures. 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of tail risk measures while Panel B shows summary statistics for return and volatility.  All 
variables are defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. Panel C provides Spearman (above) and Pearson (below) correlations between 
the risk and return measures. We represent descriptive statistics for our original sample consisting of 1994 observations. The t-statistics 
provided here are obtained using tests of differences in means and the z-statistics correspond to the tests of differences in medians using the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 No Turnovers  Forced Turnovers  Voluntary Turnovers 
 N Mea
n 
Media
n 
Std. 
Dev. 
 N Mea
n 
Media
n 
Std. 
Dev. 
t-stat z-stat  N Mea
n 
Media
n 
Std. 
Dev. 
t-
stat 
z-
stat 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) (4) ± 
(1) 
(5) ± 
(2) 
  (7) (8) (9) (7) ± 
(1) 
(8) ± 
(2) 
Panel A:  
Tail Risk 
Measures 
 
   
              
Idiosyncrat
ic ES 
172
2 
2.06
2 2.185 
0.61
6  
7
4 
2.25
3 2.463 
0.57
6 
2.775*
** 
2.877*
**  
19
8 
2.10
7 2.309 
0.63
0 
0.94
2 
1.09
2 
Systematic 
ES 
172
2 
2.94
4 3.060 
1.00
6  
7
4 
3.50
3 3.928 
0.84
2 
5.545*
** 
5.033*
**  
19
8 
3.01
8 3.267 
1.01
3 
0.97
4 
0.98
3 
Panel B: 
Return 
and 
Volatility 
Measures 
 
    
 
      
 
     
Idiosyncrat
ic Returns 
172
2 
-
0.04
5 -0.039 
0.16
6  
7
4 
-
0.10
6 -0.089 
0.20
2 
-
2.594*
* 
-
2.590*
*  
19
8 
-
0.05
3 -0.053 
0.16
6 
-
0.64
8 
-
0.75
5 
Systematic 
Returns 
172
2 0.13
5 0.130 
0.31
5  
7
4 0.06
1 0.079 
0.35
0 -1.775* -1.559  
19
8 0.11
1 0.129 
0.33
3 
-
0.94
8 
-
0.76
1 
Idiosyncrat
ic 
Volatility 
172
2 0.20
5 0.189 
0.09
1  
7
4 0.24
5 0.224 
0.10
4 
3.272*
** 
3.295*
**  
19
8 0.21
1 0.208 
0.09
5 
0.90
4 
0.99
1 
Systematic 
Volatility 
172
2 
0.25
6 0.234 
0.10
6  
7
4 
0.29
4 0.276 
0.11
1 
2.864*
** 
2.996*
**  
19
8 
0.26
6 0.244 
0.11
1 
1.19
8 
1.08
8 
 
Panel C: Correlation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) Idiosyncratic ES 1 0.405 -0.315 -0.167 0.894 0.489 
(2) Systematic ES 0.350 1 -0.048 -0.324 0.414 0.834 
(3) Idiosyncratic Return -0.337 -0.086 1 -0.172 -0.353 -0.117 
(4) Systematic Return -0.110 -0.366 -0.199 1 -0.177 -0.301 
(5) Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.805 0.522 -0.415 -0.166 1 0.587 
(6) Systematic Volatility 0.434 0.815 -0.140 -0.297 0.616 1 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics: Bank Fundamentals, Governance and Country Characteristics. 
This Table presents the descriptive statistics of all other variables which have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. The 
t-statistics provided here are obtained using tests of differences in means and the z-statistics correspond to the tests of differences in medians 
using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 No Turnovers  Forced Turnovers  Voluntary Turnovers 
 N Mea
n 
Medi
an 
Std. 
Dev. 
 N Mea
n 
Medi
an 
Std. 
Dev. 
t-stat z-stat  N Mea
n 
Medi
an 
Std. 
Dev. 
t-stat z-stat 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) (4) ± 
(1) 
(5) ± 
(2) 
  (7) (8) (9) (7) ± 
(1) 
(8) ± 
(2) 
Panel A: 
Bank 
Fundamen
tals 
 
    
 
      
 
     
Profitability 
172
2 
-
0.11
0 
-
0.004 
0.78
2  
7
4 
-
0.50
5 
-
0.458 
0.90
2 
-
3.708*
** 
-
4.182*
**  
19
8 
-
0.20
3 
-
0.104 
0.82
0 -1.519 
-
1.730* 
Industry 
Profitability  
172
2 
0.00
9 0.009 
0.00
9  
7
4 
0.00
9 0.006 
0.00
9 -0.690 -0.541  
19
8 
0.01
0 0.009 
0.01
0 0.652 0.603 
Bank Size 172
2 
18.3
62 
18.07
0 
1.28
6  
7
4 
19.1
31 
19.05
6 
1.50
3 
4.335*
** 
4.390*
**  
19
8 
18.3
42 
18.13
6 
1.16
2 -0.222 0.327 
Bank 
Capital 172
2 
7.11
7 6.547 
2.62
5  
7
2 
5.91
2 5.609 
2.51
0 
-
3.984*
** 
-
3.988*
**  
19
8 
7.00
0 6.193 
2.67
9 -0.587 -0.825 
Charter 
Value 172
2 
1.02
6 1.013 
0.05
5  
7
4 
1.00
4 1.002 
0.03
5 
-
5.056*
** 
-
2.984*
**  
19
8 
1.02
4 1.010 
0.05
6 -0.301 -0.645 
Panel B: 
Governanc
e 
Characteri
stics                   
Board Size 172
2 
2.53
7 2.565 
0.33
4  
7
4 
2.55
0 2.565 
0.38
4 0.296 0.549  
19
8 
2.52
9 2.565 
0.31
6 -0.331 -0.179 
Independen
t Directors 
172
2 
0.47
7 0.500 
0.29
3  
7
4 
0.56
4 0.542 
0.22
5 
3.204*
** 
2.401*
*  
19
8 
0.46
2 0.500 
0.27
7 -0.706 -0.784 
CEO Power 
171
9 
1.11
9 1.000 
0.63
5  
7
4 
0.85
1 1.000 
0.58
9 
-
3.815*
** 
-
3.557*
**  
19
7 
1.03
0 1.000 
0.61
4 
-
1.916* 
-
1.901* 
Insider 
Ownership 
158
1 
30.1
62 
22.99
5 
27.6
88  
6
8 
33.0
01 
28.41
4 
31.7
54 0.725 0.107  
18
6 
36.8
16 
30.09
5 
29.0
14 
2.972*
** 
3.022*
** 
Risk 
Governance 
172
2 
1.44
7 2.000 
0.73
2  
7
4 
1.67
6 2.000 
0.55
2 
3.444*
** 
2.496*
*  
19
8 
1.46
0 2.000 
0.71
7 0.241 0.144 
Supervisory 
Power 
167
2 
11.1
75 
12.00
0 
1.87
3  
7
3 
10.7
12 
11.00
0 
2.03
8 
-
1.906* 
-
1.882*  
19
2 
11.1
72 
12.00
0 
1.69
6 -0.025 -0.726 
Institutional 
Ownership 166
0 
31.2
56 
24.88
0 
23.0
10  
6
9 
33.0
27 
28.93
0 
22.7
90 0.631 0.737  
19
1 
26.6
53 
20.54
0 
22.1
99 
-
2.703*
** 
-
2.890*
** 
Panel C: 
Country 
Characteri
stics                   
Bank 
Concentrati
on 
172
2 
-
2.58
2 
-
2.717 
0.70
2  
7
4 
-
2.46
6 
-
2.436 
0.74
1 1.321 1.307  
19
8 
-
2.54
0 
-
2.715 
0.65
8 0.852 1.000 
Director 
Liability 
Index 
172
2 
6.02
0 6.000 
2.26
8  
7
4 
5.83
8 5.000 
2.02
1 -0.754 -0.885  
19
8 
5.68
2 6.000 
2.14
1 
-
2.090*
* 
-
2.018*
* 
Activity 
Restrictions 172
2 
11.9
04 
13.00
0 
3.30
2  
7
4 
11.0
95 
11.00
0 
3.15
0 
-
2.160*
* 
-
2.882*
*  
19
8 
11.9
65 
13.00
0 
3.30
4 0.243 0.293 
Developme
nt 172
2 
35.1
53 
35.45
5 
19.7
32  
7
4 
37.6
22 
44.19
5 
20.8
51 0.999 1.093  
19
8 
31.5
52 
34.97
3 
19.4
41 
-
2.464*
* 
-
2.257*
* 
Fiscal 
Capacity 172
2 
-
3.72
0 
-
3.586 
4.05
8  
7
4 
-
3.60
0 
-
3.021 
3.87
0 0.260 0.607  
19
8 
-
3.99
7 
-
3.618 
4.15
9 -0.890 -0.599 
Size of 
Economy 
172
2 
14.2
64 
14.34
8 
1.57
2  
7
4 
13.9
85 
13.97
4 
1.33
8 
-
1.743* 
-
1.764*  
19
8 
14.1
37 
14.07
3 
1.51
8 -1.110 -0.946 
Inflation 172
2 
2.45
4 2.200 
2.38
4  
7
4 
2.95
4 2.650 
2.39
2 1.762* 
2.240*
*  
19
8 
2.72
2 2.300 
2.77
5 1.304 0.765 
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Table 4 CEO Turnover and Idiosyncratic and Systematic Expected Shortfall (ES). 
This Table reports the estimates from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced and voluntary CEO 
WXUQRYHUV7KHPRGHOLVHVWLPDWHGZLWKD&(2¶VWXUQRYHUULVNPHDVXUHGDVWKH&(2¶VWHQXUHWKDWLVULJKWFHQVRUHGDVRI'HFHPEer 31, 2013. 
A positive coefficient indicates that the covariate increases the hazard rate for a CEO to be replaced and hence shortens the expected tenure. 
Idiosyncratic ES is the expected return below the 5th percentile of residual returns from the market model and the systematic ES is the 
expected return below the 5th percentile of predicted returns from the market model, as specified in equation (2). For consistency, the 
systematic and idiosyncratic returns have also been estimated following Jenter and Kannan (2015). All other variables have been defined in 
Table A1 provided in the Appendix. The z-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Forced Voluntary Forced Voluntary 
Idiosyncratic ES 0.785*** 0.080 0.684** -0.133 
 
(2.915) (0.286) (2.408) (-0.376) 
Systematic ES 0.029 0.101 0.019 0.099 
 
(0.263) (1.548) (0.129) (1.145) 
Idiosyncratic Returns 0.695 0.257 -0.570 0.797 
 (0.565) (0.229) (-0.372) (0.661) 
Systematic Returns -0.622 0.107 -0.881 0.271 
 (-1.458) (0.428) (-1.541) (0.800) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 6.008*** -1.340 5.087** -0.365 
 (3.327) (-0.581) (1.960) (-0.142) 
Systematic Volatility -1.287 -4.191** -0.731 -3.316 
 (-0.428) (-2.239) (-0.192) (-1.284) 
Profitability -0.725*** -0.210 -0.534*** -0.193 
 (-3.076) (-1.288) (-2.947) (-0.983) 
Industry Profitability -0.431** -0.044 -0.292* -0.018 
 (-2.522) (-0.216) (-1.662) (-0.074) 
Bank Size 0.760*** 0.022 0.571*** 0.105 
 (4.846) (0.150) (5.277) (0.785) 
Bank Size2 0.089 -0.080* 0.144** -0.125*** 
 (1.182) (-1.744) (2.254) (-2.937) 
Bank Capital -0.111 -0.099* -0.158** -0.101* 
 (-1.538) (-1.770) (-2.072) (-1.666) 
Charter Value -5.111 0.866 -5.131* -1.185 
 (-1.613) (0.295) (-1.829) (-0.374) 
Board Size   -0.498 -0.573* 
   (-1.628) (-1.757) 
Independent Directors   0.794 0.697 
   (0.824) (1.081) 
CEO Power   -0.785*** -0.590** 
   (-4.257) (-2.316) 
Insider Ownership   0.005 0.006 
   (0.999) (1.224) 
Risk Governance   -0.288 -0.006 
   (-1.301) (-0.043) 
Supervisory Power   0.103 0.075 
   (0.879) (1.089) 
Institutional Ownership   0.012** -0.014** 
   (2.430) (-1.971) 
Bank Concentration -0.392 0.024 -0.585* -0.120 
 (-1.306) (0.111) (-1.741) (-0.539) 
Director Liability Index 0.188*** -0.111** 0.183** -0.048 
 (3.328) (-2.509) (2.134) (-0.978) 
Activity Restrictions 0.075 -0.016 0.040 -0.001 
 (1.595) (-0.496) (0.821) (-0.010) 
Development 0.004 -0.018** 0.005 -0.025** 
 (0.335) (-2.014) (0.392) (-2.291) 
Fiscal Capacity 0.002 -0.058 -0.010 -0.073 
 (0.053) (-1.597) (-0.242) (-1.278) 
Size of Economy -0.692*** 0.064 -0.754*** 0.165 
 (-4.230) (0.603) (-3.724) (1.324) 
Inflation 0.217*** 0.014 0.214*** -0.036 
 (3.609) (0.164) (3.101) (-0.469) 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,994 1,994 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -420.1 -1257 -343.8 -1045 
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Table 5 Forced CEO Turnover and Expected Shortfall (ES): Is the Impact of Idiosyncratic Expected Shortfall (ES) due to a Poor 
Performance Effect? 
This Table reports sub-sample tests on the relationship between forced CEO Turnover and ES. Column (1) reports the estimates from 
the competing-risks hazard regression after excluding from the sample banks with idiosyncratic return below the sample median. Column 
(2) reports the estimates after excluding banks with (simultaneously) low idiosyncratic performance (below the sample median) and high 
idiosyncratic volatility (above the sample median). The z-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 Excluding Low Returns Excluding Low Returns + High Volatility  
 (1) (2) 
Idiosyncratic ES 1.347* 1.214* 
 
(1.797) (1.736) 
Systematic ES 0.076 0.031 
 
(0.279) (0.123) 
Idiosyncratic Returns 2.244 3.013 
 (0.294) (0.512) 
Systematic Returns -0.638 -0.363 
 (-0.624) (-0.383) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 2.748 6.473 
 (0.441) (1.109) 
Systematic Volatility 10.399 7.659 
 (1.236) (1.094) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 872 1,143 
Log-likelihood -123.3 -145.3 
 
Table 6 Forced CEO Turnover and Expected Shortfall (ES): Impact of Bank Market Concentration. 
This Table estimates competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The model is estimated 
ZLWKD&(2¶VWXUQRYHUULVNPHDVXUHGDVWKH&(2¶VWHQXUHWKDWLVULJKWFHQVRUHGDVRI'HFHPEHU%DQN&RQFHQWUDWLRQLV measured 
as the log of the Herfindahl index of bank deposits in each country in column (1) and as the log of the market share of bank deposits held by 
top-4 banks in each country in column (2). A positive coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the covariate increases the sensitivity 
of CEO turnovers to changes in idiosyncratic and systematic ES. All other variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the 
Appendix. The z-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 HHI of bank deposits % Market share of Top 4 Banks 
 (1) (2) 
Idiosyncratic ES 1.054*** 1.067*** 
 
(3.080) (2.796) 
Systematic ES 0.017 -0.024 
 
(0.108) (-0.140) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Bank Concentration -1.112** -3.521*** 
 (-2.408) (-3.938) 
Systematic ES * Bank Concentration 0.084 0.207 
 (1.210) (1.365) 
Bank Concentration -0.752** -1.266** 
 (-2.521) (-2.520) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.484 -0.090 
 (-0.323) (-0.050) 
Systematic Returns -0.951 -0.833* 
 (-1.638) (-1.700) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 4.458* 7.774*** 
 (1.784) (2.642) 
Systematic Volatility -0.619 0.613 
 (-0.162) (0.136) 
Other Controls YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -339.4 -337.1 
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Table 7 Forced CEO Turnover and Expected Shortfall (ES): Which Bank Stakeholders Care More About Tail Risks?  
This Table reports the estimates from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The 
PRGHO LVHVWLPDWHGZLWKD&(2¶VWXUQRYHUULVNPHDVXUHGDVWKH&(2¶VWHQXUHWKDWLVULJKWFHQVRUHGDVRI'HFHPEHU$positive 
coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the covariate increases the sensitivity of CEO turnovers to changes in idiosyncratic and 
systematic ES. All other variables have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. For brevity, only relevant covariates are shown 
in each Panel. The z-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Idiosyncratic ES 0.692** 0.852*** 0.693* 0.637** 
 
(2.197) (2.723) (1.858) (2.122) 
Systematic ES 0.087 0.051 0.075 0.012 
 
(0.656) (0.322) (0.485) (0.082) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Subordinated Debt 0.588*    
 (1.799)    
Systematic ES * Subordinated Debt 0.021    
 (0.385)    
Idiosyncratic ES * Insider Ownership  0.020*   
  (1.746)   
Systematic ES * Insider Ownership  0.001   
  (0.756)   
Idiosyncratic ES * Supervisory Power   -0.073  
   (-0.356)  
Systematic ES * Supervisory Power   0.035  
   (1.518)  
Idiosyncratic ES * Institutional Ownership    0.003 
    (0.262) 
Systematic ES * Institutional Ownership    -0.002 
    (-1.275) 
Subordinated Debt -1.413 
   
 
(-0.084) 
   
Insider Ownership  0.003   
  (0.727)   
Supervisory Power   0.066  
 
  (0.563)  
Institutional Ownership    0.014** 
    (2.444) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.654 -1.352 -0.585 -0.708 
 (-0.378) (-0.847) (-0.356) (-0.455) 
Systematic Returns -1.199** -0.862 -0.962 -0.828 
 (-2.201) (-1.456) (-1.577) (-1.326) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 5.145* 5.490* 5.498** 5.830** 
 (1.780) (1.910) (2.047) (2.236) 
Systematic Volatility -1.365 -1.606 -2.237 -1.081 
 (-0.447) (-0.380) (-0.527) (-0.269) 
Other Controls YES YES YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,449 1,722 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -318 -343.1 -344.9 -344.1 
 
Table 8 Forced CEO Turnover and Expected Shortfall (ES): Is Systematic Tail Risk Exogenous? 
This Table reports the estimates from competing-risks hazard regressions that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The 
PRGHOLVHVWLPDWHGZLWKD&(2¶VWXUQRYHUULVNPHDVXUHGDVWKH&(2¶VWHQXUHWKDWLVULJKWFHQVRUHGDVRI'HFHPEHU&ROXPQ
uses a post 2010 dummy that equals one for the post-2010 period and zero otherwise. Column (2) uses SIFI as an indicator variable that 
equals one for banks that are systemically important financial institutions. Column (3) uses Blanket Guarantee as an indicator variable that 
equals one for the time period over which bank liabilities in each country were insured. A positive coefficient on the interaction term 
indicates that the covariate increases the sensitivity of CEO turnovers to changes in idiosyncratic and systematic ES. All other variables 
have been defined in Table A1 provided in the Appendix. The z-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Idiosyncratic ES 1.184*** 0.899** 0.533* 
 
(2.719) (2.211) (1.832) 
Systematic ES 0.016 0.030 0.038 
 
(0.089) (0.172) (0.353) 
Idiosyncratic ES * Post-2010 -0.776   
 (-1.634)   
Systematic ES * Post-2010 0.201*   
 (1.768)   
Idiosyncratic ES * SIFI  -1.869  
  (-1.620)  
Systematic ES * SIFI  0.312*  
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  (1.960)  
Idiosyncratic ES * Blanket Guarantee   4.674 
   (1.434) 
Systematic ES * Blanket Guarantee   -0.236* 
   (-1.686) 
SIFI  -0.512  
  (-0.523)  
Blanket Guarantee   -1.489 
   (-0.752) 
Idiosyncratic Returns -0.899 -0.603 -1.130 
 (-0.594) (-0.345) (-0.713) 
Systematic Returns -0.840 -0.889 -0.755 
 (-1.421) (-1.638) (-1.433) 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 4.775* -2.599 5.131* 
 (1.662) (-0.524) (1.711) 
Systematic Volatility -2.537 5.512* -1.516 
 (-0.543) (1.923) (-0.447) 
Other Controls YES YES YES 
Time Dummies YES YES YES 
Observations 1,722 1,722 1,722 
Log-likelihood -345.7 -344.6 -340.2 
 
Highlights 
1. An increase in idiosyncratic tail risk raises the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover in 
large banks. 
2. The importance of idiosyncratic tail risk is lower in more concentrated banking 
markets. 
3. The importance of idiosyncratic tail risk is higher when stakeholders have more to 
lose from the risk exposure. 
4. Systematic tail risk tends to be filtered out from the firing decision, apart from when 
there is a major variation in the costs that the exposure to this risk might generate. 
 
 
